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Abstract
Our results indicate that males and females have about the same probability of being hired
in a mixed pool of male and female applicants, independently of the type of vacancy. The
probability of hiring a candidate of a certain sex is therefore determined by the gender
composition of the pool of applicants who have selected themselves on the basis of job
characteristics, hiring standards and the type of sector.
11 INTRODUCTION
The segmentation of the labour  market and the presence of discrimination are among the
most fiercely debated topics in the field of labour  economics (see Taubman and Wachter
(1986),  Cain 1986)). Particularly the gender segmentation of the labour  market has been
well documented and the presence of an extreme degree of gender segmentation in the
labour  market is a stylised fact.’ The question to which extend this segmentation is
voluntary is a politically sensitive issue.*
The results of some studies indicate that gender differences in occupational selection
may not be entirely voluntarily, but that women are rationed from particular jobs because
of a weaker attachment to the labour  force (see Gronau (1988), Lazear and Rosen (1990),
Renes and Ridder (1995), Barron et al. (1993). Nevertheless Jones and Makepeace (1996)
do not find strong indications of discriminative behaviour of British employers. Since
female workers have, on average, a less strong attachment to the labour  force, one expects
that they behave differently from male workers. For example, the study by Polachek
(1981) indicates that female applicants select those occupations in which the depreciation
of human capital when out of the labour  force is slower. One expects that rational job
seekers will apply less often for jobs for which they have lower probabilities of being
accepted for jobs paying lower wages or giving less promotion opportunities. For
example, if female candidates have lower probabilities of being accepted for permanent
jobs, then females will apply less often for these jobs.
In the current paper we will examine which vacancy characteristics determine the
gender composition of the pool of applicants. We will also test the hypothesis that the
probability of being hired differs for male and female job seekers who have applied for
the vacant job. Thus we estimate the probability of hiring a female applicant given the
gender composition of the pool. To this end we will use a data set on the employers’
recruitment behaviour containing information on the gender composition of the pool of
applicants. The advantage of this data set is that one may distinguish between vacancies
with perfect gender segregation and vacancies which receive both male and female
applicants. Such a distinction is essential because in about 72% of the filled vacancies in
the Netherlands perfect segregation occurs.
The outline of this study is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the data and the
statistical models employed. In section 3, we analyze which job characteristics determine
the degree of gender segregation in the pool of applicants. In section 4, we estimate,
firstly, the probability of hiring a female and, secondly, the probability of hiring a female
candidate from a pool of applicants. Section 5 concludes.
’ See for example Reskin and Hartmann  (1986) and Carrington and Troske (1995)).
2 For example, it is forbidden by Dutch law to express a gender requirement in the announce-
ment of the vacancy. Moreover, in the European Union and in the United States, it is illegal to
pay lower wages to females than to males for similar jobs.
22 DATA AND STATISTICAL MODELS USED
The data set used in the present analysis is based upon a survey on the recruitment
behaviour of Dutch firms “How do firms recruit?“. Firms are randomly selected every
two months and interviewed by telephone. The survey covers the period from 1991 to
1994 and it includes detailed information on a flow of about 20.000 filled vacancies. We
will analyze the filling of vacancies for which one candidate is hired. After deletion of
missing cases and manifest errors, 9033 observations are kept. Each vacancy in the data
set is described by the following variables: educational requirements, experience require-
ments, age limits, number of reactions received, vacancy duration, industrial sector, size
of the firm (i.e. the number of employees) and type of job (permanent/ temporary and
full-time/part-time). On average, the number of applicants received per vacancy is 14.10
The data set includes information on the gender of all (hired and rejected) applicants in
the pool. The 9033 vacancies are filled by 3777 females and 5256 males. The percentage
of hired applicants who are female per vacancy is thus 41.8%. The share of female
applicants per vacancy is 42.1%.
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Figure 1: Distribution ot the share ot female
applicants.
As stated in the introduction, in about 72% of all vacancies only females or only males
have applied for the job. The frequency table of the share of female applicants is given in
Figure 1. In 43% of the cases the pool of applicants consists entirely of male applicants,
whereas in 28% the applicants are all female.
The degree of segregation differs among industrial sectors (see Table I). For
example, in the construction sector 85% of the vacancies attracts only males, whereas in
the service sector 28% of the vacancies attracts only males. It is noted that even in the
service sector, where segregation is least common, perfect segregation occurs in 64% of
all vacancies. Summarizing, perfect segregation is the norm and not an exception. In
section 3, we will investigate which vacancy characteristics determine the gender composi-
3tion of the pool of applicants. The gender composition of the pool of applicants is
measured by means of the share of female applicants for a given vacancy. This share is a
continuous variable on the interval [O,l]. We estimate therefore a two-limit Tobit  model
with truncation points at 0 and 1 by using maximum likelihood estimation (see Maddala
1985).
Table I: Frequency of the composition of the pool of applicants disaggregated by sector.
Sector
industry quaternary services construction transport
Composition of the pool in
%  of the total vacancies
only male 79.8 34.1 28.2 85.3 52.6
only female 7.5 34.3 35.7 4.3 27.5
perfect segregation 87.3 68.4 63.9 89.6 80.1
male and female 12.7 31.6 36.1 10.4 19.8
number of observations 1407 2371 4061 700 494
The gender composition of the pool of applicants obviously determines the probability that
the hired candidate is female. Trivially, in case of perfect gender segregation, the
probability of hiring applicants of one sex is determined.
%  of  hwed  applicants who are  f e m a l e
FlgUIY 2: Ihe percentage or ternales hrred.
In Figure 2, the observed percentage of hired applicants who are female is given
together with the percentage based on the assumption that the gender of the applicants is
irrelevant for employers, i.e. the hired applicants are randomly drawn. The data clearly
show that differences are small. This indicates that conditional on applying for a job, the
4hiring probabilities of female and male applicants are about equal. In section 4, we
estimate the probability of hiring a female by means of a logit  model using all 9033
observations (Model I). In addition, we estimate the probability of hiring a female
candidate from a mixed  pool of applicants using 2566 observations (Model II). We
therefore exclude vacancies which receive applicants of one gender only.
Define Ni as the number of candidates of gender i, i = m,f, Ni > 0. Define Si as
the probability that an arbitrary applicant of a certain gender is hired, i = m,f. This
probability of hiring a female applicant given the gender composition of the pool reads
then as follows:
Puemale candidate  is hired JN,+,N,J  = Nf Sf
Nrs,'Nm%
(1)
Si is assumed to be a function of vacancy characteristics x in the following way Si =
exp(oix), where 8i is a vector of parameters to be estimated, i = m,f.  In order to obtain
identification, we restrict 8, to be equal to zero. In this way we estimate the effect of
exogenous factors on the probability of hiring a female candidate compared to the
probability of hiring a male applicant. When one male and female candidate apply for a
vacant position (N, = 1, N,  = l), we obtain the familiar logit  model.
3 THE SHARE OF FEMALE CANDIDATES
The estimates of the two-limits Tobit  model for the share of female candidates applying
for the vacant position are presented in Table II. These estimates can be thought of as the
result of supply side preferences for certain occupations together with the anticipation of
employers’ hiring behaviour.
Job characteristics. We find that permanent jobs attract fewer female candidates. A
plausible explanation is that the applicants’ productivity is linked to a continuous participa-
tion in the labour  market. Women, who drop more regularly out of the labour  force, may
perceive their hiring probability as being low (see Renes and Ridder (1995) and may
therefore apply less. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that full-time jobs are equally
attractive to males and females. Our finding that large firms attract less female candidates
may be explained in the light of the results of Barron et al. (1989). Generally firms screen
more applicants for positions requiring more training. Since these positions are more
numerous in large firms (Barron et al. 1987),  large firms prefer applicants who stay with
the firm for a long period in order to collect the yields from the investment in training.
Since applying is costly, female candidates who are more likely to leave the potential
employer would anticipate the (perceived) preference of the employer and would therefore
apply less often.
Hiring standards. Positions requiring a general secondary education usually receive
a larger share of female applicants. The contrary appears to hold for position requiring
high educational requirement. ‘Specific experience’ requirements and ‘age limits’ decrease
the share of female applicants. Workers with a lower quit probability tend to be concen-
trated in positions offering more training (see Barron et al. (1993)). As a result, women
may (voluntarily) sort themselves into position requiring less training.
5Table II: Maximum likelihood estimates of the share of female applicants (Standard errors
between parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
ldepedent  variables
Dependent variable
percentage of female applicants
Model: Two-Limits Tobit  model
constant 1.14 (0.17)*
Job characteristics
permanent
full-time
firm's  size(/lDD)
-0.30 (0.03)*
0.05 (0.04)
-0.02 (D.Dl)*
Hiring standards
Educational requirements
university
secondary general
secondary vocational
primary vocational
specific experience
age limit
-0.30 (0.06)*
0.63 (0.08)*
0.03 (0.06)
-0.05 (0.06)
-0.26 (0.03)*
-0.15 (0.03)*
Sector
industrial -1.47 (0.05)*
quaternary -0.01 (0.03)
construction -1.74 (0.07)*
transportation -0.55 (0.06)*
Ecmanic  conditions
regional unemployment -0.01 (0.01)
# vacancies/employment(*lD) 0.46 (0.69)
Years and bimonthly waves
1992
1993
1994
w2 (March-April)
w3 (May-June)
w4 (July-August)
w5 (September-October)
w6 (November-December)
variance
0.06 (0.06)
0.11 (0.07)
0.09 (0.07)
-0.08 (0.05)
-0.11 (0.05)*
-0.07 (0.05)
0.00 (0.05)
-0.01 (0.05)
1.12 (0.02)*
# of observations 9033
Log Likelihood full model -6139.57
Reference groups of the independent variables are given between brackets: year (1991),  wave (wl
January-February), economic sector (services), educational requirements (primary), experience
requirements (no experience requirements), age limit (no age limit), permanent position (temporary
position), full-time job (part-time job).
Sector. The industrial, construction, and transportation sectors receive less female
6applicants than the other sectors. Industry, construction, and transportation sectors are the
economic sectors where usually more physical strength is needed. In addition, the working
patterns are usually such that the combination of this type of work with household duties
may be problematic (for example, night shifts, or in the case of the transportation sector
the possibility of long distance trip abroad).
Economic conditions and bimonthly waves. The economic conditions do not affect
the share of the female candidates. Notice there is a positive (but insignificant) increase in
the share of female participants over time, which may be related to the increasing
participation degree of females in the Netherlands.
In summary, we find that job characteristics, hiring standards and the sector strongly
affect the share of female candidates. The economic conditions have no effect however.
4 THE PROBABILITY OF HIRING A FEMALE AND THE PROBABILITY OF
HIRING A FEMALE CANDIDATE FROM A POOL OF APPLICANTS
The estimates of the logit  model describing the probability of hiring a female are
presented in Table III, column 2 (Model I); the estimates of the model describing the
probability of hiring a female candidate from a pool of applicants, as modelled  in (l), are
presented in Table III, column 3 (Model II). In the latter model, we use the 2566
vacancies that received applicants of both genders.
A striking result of model I is that the significant coefficients of variables in Model I
have the same sign as those variables in the model which explain the share of female
applicants in the pool (see section 3). For example, in the construction sector, the share of
female candidates is low and probability of hiring a female are low. This implies that the
probability of hiring a female is determined by the same factors which determine the share
of females in the pool.
The estimates of the model of the probability of hiring a female candidate from a
pool of applicants (Model II) also lend support to our conclusion that the probability of
hiring a female is largely determined by the share of female candidates in the pool since
we find that the variables which have a significant effect in model I are mostly insignifi-
cant in Model II. For example, in the construction sector female candidates have the same
probability of being hired as male candidates conditional on the application. We employ
therefore a Likelihood Ratio-test to test the hypothesis that the overall effect of the
variables, except the constant, is insignificant. We find that we cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that the overall effect of all variables included is null (LR(23) = 28.21 < 2 (23); x2
(23) is 35.2 at 5% level). 3 Hence, there is no support for a systematic variation in the
hiring probabilities of female and male applicants who have applied for a job.
3 The results weakly indicates however that experience requirements lower the probability of
hiring female applicants and that in the quaternary sector female candidates have lower probabil-
ities of being hired. The latter result is remarkable. In the Dutch public sector, the female
candidate must be hired in case the best two candidates are a male and a female and are equally
suitable. Notice nevertheless that the LR-test indicates that the overall effect of all explanatory
variables is insignificant.
7Table III: Logit  estimates of the probability of hiring a woman (Model I) and of the probability of
hiring a female applicant (Model II) (Standard errors between parenthesis; *: significant at 5%).
Dependent vat lame
probability of hiring
a female a female applicant
Model I Model II
Indepedmt variables
constant
Job characteristics
0.94 (0.28)* 0.56 (0.61)
full-time
permanent
firm's size(/lOO)
Hiring standards
0.07 (0.06) 0.02 (0.14)
-0.54 (0.06)* -0.19 (0.12)
-0.04 (o.ol)* 0.01 (0.02)
Educational requirements
university
secondary general
secondary vocational
primary vocational
specific experience
age limit
Econanic sector
-0.49 (0.11)' 0.50 (0.28)
1.u (0.14)* 0.61 (0.32)
0.05 (0.10) 0.33 (0.28)
0.02 (0.10) 0.18 (0.28)
-0.45 (0.06)' -0.27 (O-12)*
-0.28 (0.06)' -0.07 (0.11)
industrial -2.29 (0.09)* -0.37 (0.20)
quaternary -0.01 (0.06) -0.24 (0.12)*
construction -2.69 (0.15)* 0.22 (0.29)
transportation -0.78 (o.lo)* 0.09 (0.29)
Econanic conditions
regional unemployment
# vacancies/employment(*lO)
Years and waves
-0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.04)
0.06 (1.19) -0.16 (0.24)
1992
1993
1994
w2 (March-April)
w3 (May-June)
w4 (July-August)
w5 (September-October)
w6 (November-December)
0.10 (0.10)
0.19 (0.13)
0.19 (0.12)
-0.10 (0.08)
-0.12 (0.09)
-0.12 (0.08)
-0.03 (0.08)
-0.07 (0.08)
-0.14 (0.20)
-0.29 (0.27)
-0.10 (0.26)
0.09 (0.17)
0.11 (0.18)
0.01 (0.17)
0.07 (0.16)
0.31 (0.17)
# of observations 9033 2566
Log Likelihood only constant model -5205.47 -1248.20
Log Likelihood full model -6139.57 -1234.10
Reference groups of the independent variables are given between brackets: year (1991),  wave (wl
January-February), economic sector (services), educational requirements (primary), experience
requirements (no experience requirements), age limit (no age Limit), permanent position (temporary
position), full-time job (part-time job).
This result suggests that the hiring probabilities of female and male applicants are
equal. We test therefore the hypothesis that the probability of being hired differs between
8male and female job seekers who have applied for the vacant job. To this end we employ
again a Likelihood Ratio-test to test the hypothesis that the overall effect of the variables
including the constant is insignificant. We find that this hypothesis is just rejected at the
5% level (LR(24) = 38.53 < x2  (24); x2  (24) is 36.4 at 5% level), whereas it is not
rejected at lower significance levels (for example, x2  (24) is 39.4 at the 2.5 % level).
Given the large data set, it seems justified to conclude that male and females have equal
probability of being hired.4 We conclude therefore that the probability of hiring a female
is largely determined by the share of females in the pool. What we actually find is that the
probability of hiring a female is slightly higher than the probability of hiring a male
candidate. We find that the probability of hiring a female from a pool of candidates equals
0.53 (the standard deviation is 0.01). 5 We may therefore reject the hypothesis that
females have a lower probability of being hired from a pool of applicants.
In conclusion, our results indicate that males and females have equal probability of
being hired conditional on having applied for a job. The probability of hiring a candidate
of a certain gender is therefore determined by the gender composition of the pool of
applicants who have selected themselves on the basis of job characteristics, hiring
standards and the type of sector.
We emphasise that our results do not contract the claims of other studies mentioned
in the introduction that some forms of gender discrimination are prevalent in the labour
market. Nevertheless our results may be interpreted as a sign that job seekers will take
such discriminatory behaviour into account such they have equal probabilities of being
hired. For example, suppose that hiring standards are higher for females than for males
(Renes and Ridder (1995)). As a consequence, male applicants will have higher probabil-
ities of being accepted, ceteris paribus. As we found that males and females have equal
probabilities of being hired conditional on having applied, this implies that particularly
females who are overqualified compared to males will apply. More effort therefore should
be devoted to understand which are the determinants of the decision to apply by male and
female applicants.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we find no support for a systematic variation in the hiring probabilities of
female and male applicants who have applied for a job. The results indicate also that
males and females have about the same probability of being hired conditional on applying,
independently of the type of vacancy. The probability of hiring a candidate of a certain
sex is therefore determined by the gender composition of the pool of applicants who have
selected themselves on the basis of job characteristics, hiring standards and the type of
4 We realize that our estimation procedure may be (slightly) biased since model I and II do not
allow for omitted heterogeneity between the firms (for example, some firms may provide free
child care) which is an underlying assumption of the logit model (model I) and model II, see
Maddala (1983). We re-estimated therefore model I and II including the variance of an omitted
unobserved variable (Kettunen (1995)). We found however identical results to those presented here
(the variances of the omitted unobserved variable do not differ significantly from zero).
5 This result has been obtained by estimating the model including the constant only. The
standard deviation has been calculated using the delta method (Goldberger 1991).
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